如果中國武力犯台........

如果中國武力犯台，台灣如何自衛?-1

“The Plan Taiwan Needs to Defend against 

China” by J. Michael Cole

《編按》:

1946年台灣遭到228事件之浩劫時，美國一位駐台官員講了一句話，『台灣太小無法獨立，但台灣問題則大到不可忽視』(Taiwan is too small to be independent; the Taiwan's issue is too big to be ignored.) 下列為外國記者客觀的、嚴峻的評估台海情勢。當大部分台灣人天天沈溺於舒適生活當中時，應該停下來思考這個問題的可能性，俗話說，『天有不測風雲』。另本文是登在網路上不起眼的國際新聞上，如果你關心台灣事務，希望它會引起你的注意。又據其他外電報導，

「美國大選初選選情逐漸明朗，也代表現任總統歐巴馬（Barack Obama）的任期接近尾聲。曾經在小布希總統任內、擔任美國駐聯合國常任副代表的奧布萊恩（Robert O'Brien）在《國家利益》網站發表評論，指蔡英文政府上任以來，台灣也進入台海兩岸關係危險期，歐巴馬任期最後幾個月對台灣尤其危險，必須嚴防中國冒進」。

《本文作者簡介》：

J. Michael Cole is a Taipei-based senior non-resident fellow with the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute and an associate researcher with the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC). He recently retired from the Thinking Taiwan Foundation and is a former analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). He has a master’s degree from the Royal Military College of Canada.

柯爾先生乃Nottingham(英國)大學中國政策學院，在台北的資深研究員，也是法國研究所專門研究中國問題的副研究員。最近自台灣智庫基金會退休，曾擔任加拿大安全情報中心分析師。他的學歷是加拿大皇家軍事學院碩士

 China's Ballistic Missiles-中國的導彈

 

After eight years of relative calm in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan turned a page in its history on May 20, when Tsai Ing-wen of the Taiwan-centric Democratic Progressive Party was sworn in as president. While it may bepremature to argue that the cross-Strait relationship has now entered a new, and possibly more conflict-prone, era under Tsai, we must nevertheless keep in mind that the military option to impose unification wasnever obviated by Beijing, and that as its power grows that option may look increasingly inevitable. Therefore, as the Tsai administration performs the onerous act of balancing between stability in the Taiwan Strait and meeting the expectations of its China-wary citizens, it must continue to prepare against the eventuality that China could resort to force of arms to break the status quo.

台灣海峽經過八年相對平靜之後，今年5月20日，因為民進黨籍的蔡英文就任新總統，而展開歷史新的一頁。若說兩岸關係在蔡英文就任後，會進入新、且可能有更多衝突的時代，也許言之過早。但我們必須記住，北京從未避免以軍事行動的選項來强制兩岸之统一，而且隨著中國軍力的增強，那種選擇已逐漸變成無法避免。因此，當蔡英文想要十分艱困地完成平衡台海之安定，及滿足島內提防中國心的人，新政府就得必須防止中國會訴諸武力，最終打破現狀的可能性。

 DF31-A(東風)周際飛彈

 射程可達全球的41-A導彈

Although not exhaustive, the following discussion looks at a number of areas that will be key to Taiwan’s ability to defend itself against external aggression in the coming years. This article, moreover, takes it for granted that Taiwan has experienced and internalized a doctrinal transformation whereby victory in the military sense no longer implies the defeat, if not annihilation, of its opponent, but rather focuses primarily on countering limiting scenarios while strengthening its deterrent capability against moreescalatory measures by its opponent. In other words, Taiwan realizes it could not possibly challenge the People’s Liberation Army symmetrically and expect to emerge victorious; instead, the main aim of its national defense strategy is—or should be—to ensure that Beijing does not resort to force in the first place.

  
                美製愛國者飛彈

雖然下列要項並非全盤性質的考量，但仍着重於台灣在未來幾年，防範入侵的能力的關鍵要素。而且本文認為理所當然，台灣已經歷過一種教條式的轉型，藉此種轉型，具軍事意義的勝利若非殲滅對方，並不意涵擊敗對方之義；而重點是在抵抗，限制更多的未發生的情形，同時另一方面加强能力以遏止敵人有更多升高的攻擊措施之預想。易言之，台灣明白它不可能具有對等實力來挑釁中國人民解放軍，並期待打嬴。相反地，台灣防衛策略之主要目的在，也應該在於確定北京首先就不會訴之於武力。

To do so, it will have to bolster its capabilities and preparedness in the following areas.

 為達到此目的，台灣必須在下列若干事項，加强防衛能力與準備。

Air Defense(空中防衛能力)

A layered air-defense architecture acts as the first line against kinetic action by the PLA. At present, the Taiwanese military arguably has the necessary means to protect key civilian and military infrastructure against a limited missile strike by the Second Artillery Corps, the branch of the military that controls China’s ballistic missile force, both conventional andnuclear. While Taiwan does not have—and likely never will acquire—the wherewithal to defend itself against a major, multi-vectorial and sustained missile strike against a vast array of facilities, the purpose of its air defense system is in reality far more realistic: it is primarily aimed at taking the option of coercive military strikes or leadership decapitation off the table.

一個防空衛體系是作為抵抗共軍活力攻勢的第一線。目前台灣軍隊，引發爭論的是，是否具備必要的措施可以保護主要的平民，與軍事基礎設施，來抵擋共軍第二砲兵軍團的有限度的飛(導)彈攻擊，此軍團是控制中國彈導飛彈部隊，包含傳統式或核子飛彈的分支單位。雖然台灣沒有，也不可能獲得必要的資金，以購買防衛抵擋主要的、多方位的與持久的飛彈，攻擊台灣陳列大片的設施的武器，但台灣防空系統的目的，實際上遠遠超過實際需要：它主要目的在針對採取強制性的軍事打擊，或斬首台灣領導階層的選項。

未完

Justin Lai（賴正雄）　

編譯於美國

06/02/2016